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Variation in income tax policies and health insurance costs are shown to be theoretically 
appropriate instruments to identify endogenous firm wage and benefit offers in a labor 
supply model.  Empirical results show that firms are more likely to provide health 
insurance benefits in states with high marginal income tax rates and low hospitalization 
costs. The model implies that over the 1983-1995 period, large increases in health 
insurance costs and reductions in marginal income tax rates lowered the probability of 
receiving health insurance benefits from employers by 10 percentage points.  This 
decrease in benefits lowered hours of labor supply by 4-7%.
Labor Supply Responses to Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
Benefits have become an increasingly large share of compensation packages offered by 
firms, representing nearly 30 percent of total compensation at large firms.  Other than legally 
required employer contributions for social security, worker's compensation and unemployment 
insurance, health insurance represents the largest average benefit outlay, averaging $3,078 per 
full time employee or about 7 percent of total compensation.  The relative cost of providing this 
benefit has risen substantially, more than doubling in real terms between 1983 and 1995.  As the 
costs of providing the benefit rose, the proportion of employees covered by employer-provided 
health insurance fell by 10 percentage points and many firms cut back on the quality of insurance 
benefits offered.1   
Given the importance of health insurance benefits to firm compensation, there has been 
surprisingly little research on the impact of health insurance on labor supply.  The review by 
Currie and Madrian (1999) suggests that most of the studies of the impact of health insurance on 
labor supply have concentrated on transition to retirement or job turnover rather than hours 
worked.  Studies of labor supply have tended to concentrate on the impacts of Medicaid or other 
government policies rather than employer compensation packages.  The few studies that have 
examined responses to employer-provided health insurance have concentrated on the impact of 
husband's health insurance on wife's labor supply. 
A notable exception is the study by Cutler and Madrian (1998) on the impact of health 
insurance costs on hours of work.  They concluded that rising health insurance costs in the 1980s 
and 1990s caused firms to cut back on the number of workers employed and to increase average 
hours for those who were retained by 3 percent.  This conclusion seems puzzling, however.  If 
firms responded to rising insurance costs by cutting back or eliminating the benefit, then one 
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would have expected labor supply to fall.  That is particularly true if access to benefits serves as 
a marginal inducement for some workers to work full-time rather than working part-time without 
benefits. 
This study examines whether the conclusion of rising average hours worked in response 
to rising health insurance costs holds up under alternative samples and assumptions about firm 
behavior.  Most importantly, we relax the assumption that health insurance benefits are 
exogenous to hours worked.  There is at least a strong prima facie case that firms condition the 
receipt of benefits on an employee's work hours.  Lettau and Buchmueller (1999) report that 86.4 
percent of full-time workers but only 23.5 percent of part-time workers receive firm-provided 
health insurance benefits.2 
An illustration of how endogenous benefits could bias the results can be found in Cutler 
and Madrian.  The impact of health insurance on hours worked per week is measured by the 
difference in work hours between workers receiving benefits and those not receiving benefits.  
Over their sample period, the proportion of employees receiving health insurance benefits falls 
by about ten percentage points.  If firms opting to discontinue health insurance benefits were 
those with a shorter work week before they dropped the health insurance benefit or are firms 
experiencing declining labor demand, then average hours in covered firms would rise while those 
in uncovered firms would fall.  That is the pattern of results that Cutler and Madrian report--
average weekly hours rose by 0.7 in covered firms and fell by 0.5 in uncovered firms.  The  
increase in insurance costs would have no impact on hours worked in firms that never provided 
the benefit, so the drop in average hours in uncovered firms in consistent with a sorting of low 
average hours firms into the uncovered group.   
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A second reason why earlier studies may have underestimated the supply response to 
changes in health insurance costs is their concentration on hours worked by prime-aged males. 
However, estimated elasticities of labor supply for prime-age males are nearly zero, so that group 
may not reflect the supply response to changes in compensation for the labor force as a whole.  
In addition, prime age males are about one-third as likely to work part-time than similarly aged 
women (Rones, Ilg and Gardner,1997) and it is in the shift from full-time to part-time work that 
one might expect to see the biggest supply response to changes in employer-provided insurance 
benefits.3   
This study adds to the existing research in several ways.  It corrects for the potentially 
endogenous wage and health insurance benefit levels.  The theory shows that variation in income 
tax rates and prices of health insurance across states and across time provide instruments for firm 
compensation strategies that are directly implied by the firm's optimization process.  The sample 
includes both men and women and includes both full- and part-time workers, providing a more 
complete range of possible labor supply responses to rising insurance costs.   By restricting the 
sample to single workers, the study avoids the complications caused by cross-effects of one 
spouse's compensation package on the other's labor supply.  Finally, the study makes use of data 
on actual costs of health insurance rather than on firm expenditures, providing better information 
on the magnitude of the shock to the relative costs of offering benefits versus wages. 
The empirical work demonstrates that the probability of receiving health insurance 
through one's employer is significantly affected by insurance costs and income tax rates.  Hours 
of labor supply are strongly positively influenced by the probability of receiving benefits and by 
the level of those benefits.  Because insurance costs rose and income tax rates fell over the 
period, there was a 10 percentage point reduction in the probability of receiving employer-
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provided health insurance between 1983 and 1995.  In our sample of single workers, this 
reduction in benefits led to a 4-7% reduction in average hours worked. 
 
I.  Stylized Facts Regarding Employer Contributions to Health Insurance 
Insurance premiums rose rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s.  As shown in Table 1, 
correcting for inflation, the average cost to community hospitals of a one-day stay plus services 
rose 124 % from 1983 to 1995.  The most common type of privately provided health insurance in 
the United States is hospitalization coverage.  Of those covered for hospitalization, 99% had 
coverage paying 80% or more of the average cost of a semi-private hospital room in the local 
area.  As confirmed in conversations with people in the insurance industry, cross sectional 
variation in insurance rates are tied in part to the cross-sectional information on daily hospital 
costs.4   
In apparent response to this dramatic increase in the cost of providing health insurance 
benefits, firms cut back on benefit provision.  The proportion of single workers covered by 
employer-provided health insurance fell from 71% to 61%5, nearly identical to the drop in 
coverage rates reported by Sheu for the labor market as a whole.  Average real employer 
contributions only rose 24% over the period, so employer contributions fell considerably short of 
the 124% increase in premium costs.  Looking only at employees who retained benefits over the 
period, employer contributions rose only 88%.  The implication is that not only did many 
employers stop offering health insurance benefits, but that the quality of health insurance 
benefits offered also fell.  
Previous studies had used the level of employer contributions to health insurance as a 
measure of insurance cost.  A second implication from Table 1 is that the time path of employer 
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health insurance contributions understates the actual increase in costs of health insurance.  In 
addition, the level of employer contributions may have been responding to factors other than 
rising insurance premiums.  Income tax rates were also changing across states.  Over the sample 
period, average state tax rates rose 44% while marginal tax rates fell by 25%.  Because insurance 
benefits are untaxed, firms are more likely to provide benefits in states with high income tax 
rates.  These changes in average and marginal tax rates would be expected to have conflicting 
effects on firm incentives to provide health insurance benefits. Nevertheless, to the extent that 
employer contributions were changing in response to tax incentives rather than premium costs, 
there is a further reason to believe that employer contributions to health insurance are a poor 
measure of insurance costs. 
The results in Table 1 highlight why previous conclusions that health insurance costs led 
to increases in hours worked may be overstated.  Firms appear to have changed the quality of 
benefits over the period, so a dummy variable indicating the presence or absence of the benefit 
will not capture the change in the quality of benefits over time.  In addition, it seems apparent 
that the provision of benefits changes in response to economic incentives, indicating the need to 
treat the benefit as an endogenous choice. 
II.  Employer and Employee Incentives Regarding Health Insurance  
A.  The Employer’s Tradeoff 
 Firms have several reasons why they may want to provide health insurance benefits to 
their employees.  One is that firms almost certainly can obtain more favorable terms in acquiring 
health insurance than can their employees.  Thus, by offering the benefit rather than a similar 
dollar amount of wages, the firm may be able to raise worker utility without adding 
compensation cost. 
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 There are two main reasons why employers can access health insurance at a lower cost 
than can individual workers.  First, employers can bundle many health insurance policies into 
one.  This gives the employer some market power in bidding down the cost per covered member.  
Insurance companies are willing to cut the price of a pooled policy because of the lower cost of 
providing multiple clients the same menu of services. 
 Firms also face lower cost of procuring health insurance because of the favorable tax 
treatment given to benefits versus wages.  A worker who buys an insurance policy must pay with 
after-tax earnings.  Thus, if a worker earns $W in wages which he uses to purchase health 
insurance, he will only have $W(1-t) left to purchase the insurance policy, where t < 1 is the 
marginal income tax rate.  If instead, the firm pays the same amount in compensation but in the 
form of a health insurance benefit, the worker receives $W of the insurance benefit.6 
 Our interest is to illustrate why firms may make different choices regarding the mix of 
wages and benefits to offer their employees.  A likely candidate is variation in health insurance 
costs and income tax rates across states.  However, it is also likely that workers supply of hours 
or effort will be influenced by the levels of wages and benefits.  Consequently, the firm’s profit 
maximizing compensation decisions will reflect the firm’s beliefs about worker labor supply 
behavior. 
 For the firm to attract workers, it must offer a compensation package that at least meets a 
worker’s opportunity wage at other firms, (Z)U .  Z is an index of skill such that 0U2 > .  The 
firm’s wage, W, health insurance benefit, B, and work hours, h, must satisfy 
h),B,t),U(W(1(Z)U −<  where UW > 0, UB > 0, and Uh < 0, and where t is the tax rate. 
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 This implies that for workers of a given skill level Z, and other attributes X, a firm will 
face a supply schedule of hours that their employers are willing to work.  The supply schedule is 
given by 
 X)Z,B;t)W,h((1h −=  (1) 
where hW > 0, hWW < 0, hB > 0, hBB < 0.  Equation (1) implies that the firm can induce more 
hours from its workers of a given skill level by raising the after-tax wage rate, (1-t)W, or by 
raising health insurance benefits, B.  However, it becomes more expensive to increase hours of 
work by raising compensation as the levels of W and B increases.7 
 Given (1), the firm is assumed to choose a level of employment and compensation mix so 
as to maximize profit.  The firm’s profit maximization problem, treating the output price as 
numeraire, can be written 
  B)CN(Whf(Nh)max B
BW,N,
+−=π  (2) 
where CB is the cost of obtaining a health insurance policy for an employee. 
 The firm chooses N directly but sets h implicitly by its choice of W and B.  The firm’s 
short-run production function )f(• , depends on the total hours of labor employed.  While we 
view )h(•  as an hours of labor supply equation, the story can also be couched in terms of the 
effort exerted by workers.8  The production function is assumed to be concave in the labor input. 
 Inserting (1) into (2) and taking the first order conditions, we obtain 
  0B)C(whfh
N
B =+−′=∂
∂π  (3A) 
  0t)hNW(1Nht)h(1fN
W
π
WW =−−−−′=∂
∂  (3B) 
  0NWhNChfN
W
π
B
B
B =−−′=∂
∂  (3C) 
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Condition (3B) can be arranged as 
  WW t)Wh(1hft)h(1 −+=′−  (4) 
 This means that the firm will raise wages to the point where the revenue from the induced 
increase in hours supplied equals the cost of the increased hours plus the cost of raising the wage 
for the h hours the firm had already induced.  Notice that for each dollar increase in wages, the 
employees only respond to $(1-t), their after-tax share. 
 In a similar manner, condition (3C) implies that 
  B
B
B WhCfh +=′  (5) 
Here, the firm will raise benefit levels until the gain in revenue from induced increased labor is 
equal to the cost of raising the benefit.  The latter includes both the direct cost of raising B plus 
the increased wage bill from the induced increase in hours worked. 
 Conditions (3B) and (3C) can be manipulated to generate the condition 
  B
B
W
t)C(1
h
h
h
−=   (6) 
The firm’s decision of how to divide compensation between wages versus health insurance 
benefits will depend on the relative cost of raising each form of compensation and their relative 
impacts on labor supply.  As current hours increase or as the tax rate increases, it becomes more 
expensive to raise compensation through a wage increase rather than an increase in benefits.  
Conversely, higher insurance costs make it more attractive to increase compensation through a 
wage increase. 
 Equation (6) has two important implications.  First, it illustrates why incentives to offer 
health insurance rise as hours worked increase, consistent with the large difference between full 
and part-time workers in the receipt of insurance benefits.  Second, the firm’s decision on the 
 9
level of wages or benefits will depend on relative costs of offering the two forms of 
compensation, suggesting that tax rates and insurance costs will be useful instruments to identify 
endogenous firm compensation decisions. 
 The first-order condition (3A) implies that the firm will hire workers until the revenue 
generated from the last worker equals the anticipated cost of total compensation.  Additional 
insights can be obtained by inserting (3B) and (3C) into (3A) to generate 
  ( ) W)f(Bht)Wh(1fh BW −′+−=′   
Dividing both sides of the equation by h, this converts to 
  hB
h
W Et)E(1W)f(
f +−=−′
′
 (7) 
where hWE  is the elasticity of hours supplied with respect to wages and 
h
BE  is the elasticity of 
hours supplied with respect to the insurance benefit.  The standard condition for a firm that takes 
wages as given exogenously is W.f =′   As f ′  approaches W on the left-hand-side, the right-
hand-side becomes infinitely large.  This is consistent with a perfectly elastic labor supply curve 
at the market-determined wage, so that ∞→hWE  as assumed for a firm in a perfectly 
competitive labor market.  If the hours elasticities are of finite size, then the firm will set wages 
and benefits endogenously.   
B.  Full-time versus Part-time Contracts 
 If workers have diminishing marginal utility of leisure, it will become increasingly 
difficult to induce additional hours of labor supply through a wage increase.  Because an 
individual faces rising disutility from hours of work as hours increase, a convex compensation 
mechanism would be more efficient at inducing additional hours of work.  Equation (6) suggests 
that the firm will increase benefits as hours supplied become less sensitive to wage increases.  
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However, benefits may also be used to create the convex compensation mechanism needed to 
induce additional labor supply as h increases.  This happens when firms offer health benefits 
only to their full-time workers but not to their part-time workers.  As reported by Currie and 
Yelowitz (2000), this is a common practice.  In 1994, 74% of establishments had minimum hours 
requirements to qualify for health insurance benefits.9 
Figure 1 shows the budget constraint from the perspective of a firm offering part-time 
and full-time jobs to a worker.  The worker could earn the wages WNB if he receives no benefits.  
However, after H* hours of work, the firm provides a benefits package that shifts the budget 
constraint upward.  Because it is providing benefits, the firm can lower hourly wages and still 
meet the reservation utility condition, so the wage it pays with benefits satisfies WB < WNB.10 
 Workers facing the choice of how many hours to work look at the after-tax reward 
structure.  These choices are illustrated in Figure 2.  When an individual is faced with the 
compensation package that has no health benefit, he would opt for the part-time job and earn 
t)(1WH NB0 − .  However, when the alternative contract is offered with health insurance benefits 
added after a minimum of H* hours, the worker is induced to work full time at compensation 
level B t)(1WH B
* +− . 
 For workers who would already be beyond H* when faced with the wage only contract, 
say, at hours level H1, the health benefit contract would induce a reduction in hours worked.  For 
such workers, the health insurance benefit induces both an income and a substitution effect away 
from hours worked.  Knowing this, firms will want to set the minimum hours necessary to obtain 
the health benefit at the upper-tail of the distribution of hours worked under the wage only 
contract, reinforcing the implication of equation (6) that firms will increasingly use benefits at 
higher levels of hours.11 
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III.  Empirical Strategy 
 Our aim is to estimate labor supply equations of the form 
  τ)P,t),V(1B,t),h(W(1h −−=  (8) 
where W, t and B are defined above, V is a nonlabor income, P is a price index and τ  is an index 
for value of time in nonmarket activities.  In principle, equations such as (8) can be estimated if 
wages and benefits are exogenous.  However, it is virtually certain, given our discussion above,  
that the firm's level of wages and benefits will be chosen jointly with hours worked.  
Consequently, we need to be able to derive instruments for W and B. 
 Equation (6) suggests that plausible instruments for W and B can be derived from state 
income tax rates, tS, and measures of the cost of offering benefits relative to wages.  In addition 
to the direct cost of health insurance, CB, local labor market conditions, L, will affect the relative 
cost of benefits.  High earnings states will be exposed to higher federal marginal tax rates which 
may make untaxed nonwage compensation more attractive.  Firms with more cyclical labor 
demand or high turnover may find it more expensive to provide benefits with significant fixed 
costs such as health insurance.12  Similarly, unionized firms may face lower benefit costs because 
of lower turnover, shared administrative costs between the union and the firm, or shared costs of 
negotiating for better insurance premiums. Wage and benefit levels will also reflect the workers 
level of skill, Z. 
 The instrumenting equations will be of the form 
  
Z)L,,,C(tB
Z)L,,C,W(tW
BS
BS
=
=
 (9) 
Our strategy is to use (9) to identify W and B in (2), yielding unbiased estimates of the supply 
responses to W and B. 
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 There is another reason to opt for an instrumental variables strategy to identify health 
insurance benefits and wages, even if these forms of compensation could be considered 
exogenously determined.  Berger, Black and Scott (1998) found that employees and employers 
disagree on the level and incidence of health insurance coverage provided by the employer.  
They found that when the CPS measure of health insurance is used as an explanatory variable, its 
coefficient is significantly biased toward zero.  This suggests that earlier estimates of health 
insurance effects on hours of work may be too small.  Blundell and MaCurdy (1999, pp.1622-
1625) argue that instrumental variables can serve as a robust method to correct for both 
endogeneity and measurement error in the analysis of tax effects or other nonlinear budget 
constraints on labor supply.  Consequently, the same mechanism used to correct for possible 
endogeneity in (9) can also serve as an instrumental variables mechanism to correct for 
measurement error in observed health insurance benefits. 
IV.  Data 
 The primary data set is based on the 1983, 1987, 1991, and 1995 editions of the March 
Current Population Surveys (CPS).  The years were selected to span a period when the cost of 
health insurance was rising rapidly relative to the consumer price index.  The specific years 
correspond to years when public use information on hospital costs by state were available.  These 
data are used by insurance companies to set rates.  The real cost of hospitalization more than 
doubled over the twelve year period.  This measure has clear advantages over the expenditure 
data used previously to proxy for health insurance costs.  Expenditures are themselves a function  
of the number and quality of health insurance policies that firms are offering their workers and 
are therefore endogenous. 
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 The analysis concentrates on single workers aged 25 to 60.  By concentrating on single 
workers, we are able to insure a one-to-one correspondence between health benefits offered and 
health benefits received.  In the case of married couples, one spouse may opt to decline a firm’s 
offered health benefits if the spouse’s employer offers a dominant package.  In addition Dranove, 
Spier and Baker (2000) argue that firms modify benefit packages to attempt to induce employees 
to opt for their spouse’s benefit package.  These problems are not an issue for single workers in 
the CPS because the observed variation in health insurance benefits received will also be the 
actual variation in compensation offered.13 
 Our sample is restricted to single civilians aged 25 to 60 who reside in the continental 
United States.  Individuals who were classified as students, disabled or retired were excluded.  
The self-employed were excluded because of measurement problems in determining 
compensation terms for those who employ themselves and set their own hours.  Finally, the 
unemployed were excluded because of the absence of information on hours, wages or benefits.14  
The final sample consists of 27,564 individuals spread over the four years. 
 In contrast with samples of prime-aged males used in previous analyses of the impact of 
health insurance provision on work hours, this sample of singles more closely mimics the range 
of hours worked and health insurance benefits received in the labor force as a whole.  The 
distributions of benefits received and hours worked are reported in Table 2.  The proportion of 
single workers receiving employer-provided benefits is virtually identical to the proportion of all 
workers aged 25-64 receiving own employer provided benefits reported by Currie and Yelowitz 
(2000).  Their estimates for 1987, 1991 and 1995 were 68%, 61% and 62%, compared to our 
corresponding estimates for single workers of 68%, 62% and 61% for the same respective years. 
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As indicated above (footnote 3), sample of prime-age males used in earlier studies had benefit 
rates that were much higher than the labor market average. 
  The hours distribution for singles matches nearly exactly the distribution of work hours 
reported by Rones, Ilg and Gardner (1997).  Whereas 25.7% of single workers work part-time, 
the corresponding proportion in the overall labor force is 24%.  The proportion of prime-age 
males working part-time is typically below 10%.  Single workers were somewhat more likely to 
work 35-39 hours per week and somewhat less likely to work over 41 hours, but the differences 
are slight.  Nevertheless, the sample of single workers includes broad variation in hours and 
health insurance benefits that are more indicative of the range of hours and benefits observed in 
the labor market as a whole than are the hours and benefits observed for prime-age males.  
Consequently, the sample of singles workers should yield labor supply responses that better 
reflect the range of hours responses for the labor market as a whole. 
A.  Endogenous Variables 
 Summary information on the variables and their empirical definitions are included in 
Table 3.  The main variable of interest is hours worked per year.  This is measured by 
multiplying weeks worked last year by usual hours worked per week in the CPS.  The other 
endogenous variables are wages and health benefits.  Wages are measured by weeks worked last 
year times average weekly earnings, divided by annual hours of wage work. 
 Two measures of employer provided health insurance are available.  The first is a 
continuous measure of the dollar amount of the employer’s contribution to health insurance.  The 
alternative measure is a dummy variable indicating whether the employer contributes to health 
insurance.  The value of the dichotomous measure as opposed to the dollar amount of the benefit 
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is that it may be the existence of the discontinuity as opposed to changes in the marginal value of 
the benefit that affect labor supply. 
B.  Exogenous Variables 
 The key identifying variables in the wage and benefit equations include measures of the 
firm’s cost of acquiring health insurance, state tax rates, and local labor market conditions.  The 
cost of health insurance is based on the average daily cost per patient in community hospitals, 
reported by state in the Source Book of Health Insurance Data.  This data was supplemented by 
estimates of the ratio of metropolitan to nonmetropolitan health care costs by state in 1995 which 
was provided to us by a national insurance company.  The latter data allow us to introduce 
variation in health insurance costs across metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas within a state. 
 Let CB be the average cost of hospital beds in the state and let Bn
B
m /CCr =  be the ratio of 
metropolitan to nonmetropolitan health insurance cost in the state.  Let mα  be the share of the 
state’s population that resides in a metropolitan area.  Then 
  
)α1r(αC
)Cα(1rCαC
mm
B
n
B
nm
B
nm
B
−+=
−+=  
The metropolitan and nonmetropolitan health insurance costs can be derived from information on 
CB, r and mα  using 
  
)α1r/(αCC
rCC
mm
BB
n
B
n
B
m
−+=
=  (10) 
under the assumption that r does not vary over time.  Increases in heath insurance costs should 
lower incentives for firms to provide health benefits and raise wage share of total compensation. 
 Increases in a state's income tax rate should increase incentives for firms to provide 
health insurance because benefits are untaxed.  The effect on wages should also be positive 
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because employers need to offer a competitive after-tax rate to attract and retain workers.  We 
make use of two measures of the state's income tax level.  The first is the average state income 
tax rate.  The second is the summed average of the federal and state marginal income tax rates.  
Information on average state tax income rates and the marginal federal and state income tax rates 
have been appended to the CPS data by Unicon Research Corporation. 
 The variables used to describe local labor market conditions include the employment 
growth rate, the unemployment rate, the average non-supervisory manufacturing wage and union 
coverage.  Tight labor market conditions, resulting from a strong economy, should have a 
positive effect on labor demand.  On the other hand, firms in unstable labor markets with high 
probability of unemployment may want to avoid compensation packages with high fixed costs. 
 The log of the state average non-manufacturing wage is used as an indicator of local 
wage competition that should have a positive effect on both forms of competition.  In addition, 
states with high average incomes will have higher tax rates on average, which may give an added 
reason for firms to offer benefits.  Numerous studies have shown that unionized workers receive 
higher wages and benefits (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). 
 The remainder of the variables includes measures of skill, living costs and geographic 
variables.  Measures of skill include linear and quadratic terms in experience and education.15  
The effects of these variables should be similar, whether compensation is measured in wages or 
benefits.  Following Mincer (1974) these measures of human capital are expected to have a 
positive but diminishing marginal effect on wages.  Changes in the cost of living over time are 
captured by changes in the consumer price index.  Cross-sectional variation in living costs is 
controlled by measures of land prices in the state and a series of dummy variables indicating 
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region of the country and metropolitan residence.  The rest of the variables in the wage and 
benefit equations include dummy variables indicating gender and race. 
 Following the specification suggested by equation (8), the independent variables used in 
the labor supply equation include the instrumented measures of employer-provided health 
insurance and hourly wage rates less taxes.  Nonlabor income is measured by taxable income 
minus earned income.  This was multiplied by one minus the average tax rate to generate 
household non-wage income less taxes. 
 Controls for the value of nonmarket time, τ, in equation (8) include measures of skill and 
individual and household demographics.  In addition to those used in the compensation 
equations, we include measures of the number of persons in the household and the number of 
children under six. 
 The remaining geographic and price variables are the same as those in the compensation 
equations.  These measures are included to correct for changes in the purchasing power of wages 
and income over time and across areas of the country. 
V.  Estimation 
 The theory suggests that equations (8) and (9) can be approximated by a system of 
equations of the form 
  hτPvBw eτβPβt)lnV(1βg(B)βt)lnW(1βlnh +++−++−=  (11a) 
  WZL
B
C
S
t eZγLγlnCγlntγlnW ++++=  (11b) 
  ZZL
B
C
S
t eZδLδlnCδlntSg(B) ++++=  (11c) 
where P is a vector of cost of living measures, τ is a vector of indicators of the value of 
nonmarket time, L is a vector of local labor market variables, and Z is a vector of skills.  Where 
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possible, variables are transformed into logarithmic form so that their associated coefficients can 
be interpreted as elasticities. 
 Efficient estimation would suggest estimating (11a-c) jointly, imposing the restrictions 
implied by wage and benefit equations on the hours equation.  The nature of the benefits data 
complicates that strategy.  Because 35 percent of the employees in the sample receive no firm 
provided health benefits, B could be measured as a dummy variable.  This suggests a two-stage 
estimation procedure in which the first stage involves estimating (11c) using a probit procedure 
and (11b) is estimated using least-squares.  Predicted values from the first-stage are inserted into 
(11a) in the second stage.  While this would yield consistent estimates of the parameters, the 
standard errors would be biased.  To generate correct standard errors, we use a bootstrap 
procedure in which we replicated the estimation over 100 (random) samples with replacement of 
the full data set. 
 The second strategy we employed used the level rather than the presence or absence of 
employer contributions to health insurance.  It is convenient to transform the benefits measure 
into natural logarithms, so we added $1 to every observed benefit to eliminate the problem of 
taking logs of zero values.  We then estimated equations (11a-c) as a system of equations.  We 
discuss the results of each of these estimation strategies in turn. 
VI.  Results 
 The estimates in which benefits are measured as a dichotomous variable indicating 
whether the firm pays for health insurance are reported in Table 4.  The first two columns report 
the compensation equations.  Both wages and benefits rise with skill.  At sample means, wages 
rise 14 percent per year of experience and 12.3 percent per added level of educational 
attainment.16  The corresponding impacts on the probability of getting employer-provided health 
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insurance are 0.7 percent per year of experience and 5.5 percent per added education level.  Both 
wages and benefits are higher for whites, union members, and those who live in metropolitan 
areas.  Single women face an 8 percent lower wage on average than comparably skilled men but 
are 4.7 percent more likely to receive health insurance benefits.  Workers in the Midwest are 
more likely to receive health insurance but face lower wages than do comparably skilled workers 
elsewhere.  Measures of local labor market conditions have little impact on wages, but areas with 
higher average earnings and rising employment are significantly more likely to receive employer 
provided health insurance.  This suggests that benefits more than wages are used to attract or 
retain workers as labor markets tighten. 
 Our primary interest is to assess whether variation in state taxes and insurance costs can 
be used to identify firm wage and benefit offers.  The answer appears to be yes.  Firms in states 
and metropolitan areas facing higher insurance costs were significantly less likely to offer 
benefits.  The implied elasticity is -0.07, so a ten percent increase in health insurance cost lowers 
the probability of receiving benefits by 0.7 percent.  In addition, both higher state average and 
marginal income tax rates led to a higher probability of firms offering health insurance benefits. 
 Evaluated at sample means, the elasticities of the probability of receiving benefits with 
respect to state income tax rates were 0.01 with respect to average rates and 0.34 with respect to 
marginal income tax rates.  This implies that marginal tax rates are more important than average 
tax rates in affecting the decision of whether to offer health insurance benefits.  Unlike most 
studies, an increase in insurance costs did raise wages as would be expected if firms trade off 
wages and benefits as implied by the reservation utility condition, but the estimate is very small 
and imprecise.  Higher tax levels did raise the wages that firms had to pay, also consistent with 
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the reservation utility hypothesis.  The positive impact of income taxes on wages suggests that 
some of the incidence of the income tax is shifted from workers to firms. 
 The third column contains estimates of the labor supply equation.  Labor supply responds 
negatively to the presence of young children and other members of the household.  Nonlabor 
income also lowers hours worked.  Exogenous shifts in after tax wages have a significant 
positive impact on hours worked with an elasticity of 0.11.  Employer provided benefits have an 
even stronger positive effect on hours worked.  The implied elasticity of work hours with respect 
to an increase in the probability of receiving benefits is 0.43.  Because most firms condition 
receipt of the insurance benefit on the number of hours worked, we can interpret the increase in 
probability of receiving benefits as an increased probability of a convex kink in the budget 
constraint.  These results suggest that the kink in the budget constraint created by the provision 
of health insurance benefits strongly increases the hours worked by single workers. 
 The real cost of health insurance rose 124% over the sample period, implying an 8.4% 
decrease in the probability of receiving benefits.  This in turn would imply a 3.4% decrease in 
hours of labor supply.  At the same time, average state income taxes rose 44% while marginal 
income tax rates fell 25%.  The combined impact of these tax changes was to lower the 
probability of receiving benefits by 8% and to lower hours worked by 3.4%.  Taken as a whole, 
the model's estimates imply that changes in tax rates and health insurance costs lowered the 
probability of receiving benefits by 10 percentage points between 1983 and 1995, equal to the 
observed reduction in the proportion of workers receiving employer-provided health insurance 
benefits over the period.  The decrease in provision of benefits would have led to a 7% reduction 
in average hours worked. 
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 Table 5 presents the results from the simultaneous estimation of equations (11a-c).  The 
null hypothesis that the three equations are independent was easily rejected.  The correlation 
matrix of the residuals indicates that unobserved attributes that raise wages also raise benefits.17  
Residuals from the benefit and hours equations are also positively correlated.  The wage and 
hours residuals are nearly uncorrelated.  
 Despite the difference in estimation methods used in Tables 4 and 5, the stories that 
emerge are quite similar.  Outcomes regarding how benefits and wages respond to measured 
skill, gender, minority status, residency status, business cycle, and union coverage are virtually 
identical across the tables. 
 The impacts of health insurance costs and taxes are also much as in Table 4.  The effects 
on wages are virtually identical.  As before, firms do not appear to raise wages much, if at all, in 
response to an increase in health insurance premiums.  Wage responses to increases in tax rates 
are much larger, particularly with respect to the marginal income tax rate. 
 A ten percent increase in health insurance costs lowers the employer’s contribution to 
health insurance by 3.5 percent.  The impact is five times larger than the effect on the probability 
of receiving benefits, so firms are more apt to decrease the level of health insurance benfits than 
to eliminate the benefit altogether.  The elasticities of employer contributions with respect to tax 
levels are also larger than in Table 4.  The elasticity of benefit level with respect to the average 
income tax rate is 0.09, while the implied elasticity with respect to marginal income tax rates is 
2.16.  Raising the marginal tax rate by one percentage point increases employer contributions to 
health insurance by 12.8 percent. 
 Turning to the labor supply effects, the elasticity of hours worked with respect to 
employer health insurance contributions is 0.04, one-tenth the size of the response to the 
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probability of receiving benefits reported in Table 4.  Apparently, the kink in the budget 
constraint caused by the benefit is more important in influencing labor supply decisions than is a 
change in the level of the employer’s contribution.  A percentage change in the wage has an 
impact on hours worked roughly four times larger than that of a percentage change in the 
employer’s health insurance contribution. 
 Over the sample period, the implied impact of the changes in health insurance costs and 
income tax rates on employer contributions to health insurance are -43% and -50%,  respectively.  
The corresponding implied changes in hours worked are -1.9% and -2.2%,  respectively.  In total, 
the model projects that reductions in employer health insurance contributions induced by 
changes in insurance premiums and tax rates led to a 4.1% decrease in hours worked. 
VII.  Conclusions 
 This study shows that variation in the cost of health insurance and in state tax rates can 
identify the levels of wages and health insurance benefits offered by firms.  This allows us to 
estimate the impact of employer contributions to health insurance on hours worked.  We test the 
empirical strategy on a sample of single workers included in the Current Population Survey for 
various years between 1983 and 1996.  The analysis led to several important conclusions: 
 1) Increases in income tax rates, particularly at the margin,  raise wage levels for firms, 
presumably because of the need to compete for workers by offering competitive after-tax 
compensation packages.  As a result, some of the incidence of income taxes is shifted to firms. 
 2) Both average and marginal tax rates raise the incidence and level of firm provided 
health insurance.  The impact of marginal tax rates is nearly four times larger than that of 
average tax rates. 
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 3) There are some sharp differences in the probability of receiving health insurance 
benefits between workers.  Workers who are white, covered by collective bargaining and 
residing in metropolitan areas are significantly more likely to receive benefits.  Interestingly, 
women are more likely to receive benefits, even though women are more likely to receive lower 
wages on average. 
 4) Employer provision of health insurance benefits has a large and significant impact of 
labor supply.  A 10 percent increase in the probability of receiving the benefit raises hours 
worked by 4.3 percent.  Marginal increases in the dollar amount of the benefit have much smaller 
effects, suggesting that the kink in the budget constraint may be more important than the benefit 
level in influencing labor supply. 
 5)  In contrast to results reported for samples of prime-age males, reductions in health 
insurance benefits induced by rising health premiums and falling marginal tax rates led to a 4-7% 
reduction in average hours worked by single workers over the period.  Such a result could 
explain an apparent increase in hours worked by those retaining benefits because those in the 
uncovered group would include workers who would have reduced work hours because they lost 
employer-provided health insurance coverage. 
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Figure 1:  Alternative compensation packages with and without health insurance benefits:  
firm’s perspective.  
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Figure 2:  Alternative compensation packages with and without health insurance:  
worker’s perspective. 
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Table 1:  Average Real Health Insurance Costs, Tax Rates, and Benefit Levels, 1983-1995 
 
  
1983 
 
1987 
 
1991 
 
1995 
 
Insurance Cost Indexa,b 
 
1.0 
 
1.23 
 
1.43 
 
2.24 
 
Benefit Level Indexa 
 
1.0 
 
1.05 
 
1.30 
 
1.24 
 
Coverage Ratec 
 
0.71 
 
0.68 
 
0.62 
 
0.61 
Benefit Level Index for 
Covered Employeesa,d 
 
1.0 
 
1.10 
 
1.50 
 
1.88 
 
Average Tax Rate 
 
0.025 
 
0.029 
 
0.033 
 
0.036 
 
Marginal Tax Rate 
 
0.20 
 
0.19 
 
0.16 
 
0.15 
 
Source:  Authors' compilations of average values for single employees in the Current Population 
Surveys, various years. 
a In constant 1983 dollars. 
b Based on daily cost of hospitalization reported for the respondent's state and residential 
population. 
c Proportion of employees receiving firm provided health insurance benefits. 
d Excludes all employees who are not receiving employer -provided health insurance benefits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Employer-provided Health Insurance and Hours Worked Per Week 
 Hours Per Week, 1983-1995 
 1-14 15-24 25-34 35-39 40 41+ 
 
Benefit > 0 
 
0.18 
 
0.33 
 
0.48 
 
0.67 
 
0.76 
 
0.78 
Observations 1982 2337 2790 2935 11546 5972 
Share (%) 7.1 8.5 10.1 10.6 41.9 21.7 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on sample of single workers from the CPS in 1983, 1987, 
1991 and 1995. 
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Table 3:  Sample Statistics and Definitions. 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Definition 
 
B>0 
 
.65 
 
.48 
 
Dummy variable indicating employer provides 
health insurance contribution 
ln B 3.69 4.47 Log of one plus the employer health insurance 
contribution 
ln W 2.10 .70 Log of hourly wage last year 
ln (h) 7.46 .59 Log of hours of work last year 
EXP 18.6 8.5 Age—years of education—6 
EDUC 8.3 2.3 Index of education level (from 0:none to 
12:beyond Master's degree) 
FEMALE .43 .50 Female 
BLACK .13 .34 Black 
OTH MINORITY .04 .20 Other minority groups 
ln (JOB GRO) .01 .03 Log of state annual employment growth 
ln (AVG EARN) 2.37 .17 Log of state average manufacturing earnings 
UNEMP 6.97 2.34 State unemployment rate 
UNION .01 .07 Covered by collective bargaining 
ln (CPI) 4.83 .16 Log of the consumer price index 
ln (PLAND) 7.17 .75 Log of state average farmland value 
METRO .84 .37 Metropolitan residence 
NEAST .30 .46 Northeastern residence 
WEST .22 .41 Western residence 
SOUTH .26 .44 Southern residence 
ln (CB) 6.5 .41 Log of daily hospital in the state, by metro or 
nonmetro residence 
St  .03 .02 Average state income tax rate 
tS .17 .02 Average marginal tax rate in the state 
CHILD < 6 .05 .25 Number of children under 6 in the home 
NUMBER 1.87 1.3 Number of persons in the home 
ln (V(1-t)) 9.7 .31 Log of non-wage income after taxes 
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Table 4:  Bootstrap Estimation of the Compensation and Labor Supply Equations 
Variable ln W B > 0a ln (h) 
EXP .041** .056** .007** 
 (.004) (.008) (.003) 
EXP2 -.0005** -.0005** -.0002** 
 (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) 
EDUC .191** .317** -.017** 
 (.016) (.031) (.007) 
EDUC2 -.003** -.008**  
 (.001) (.001)  
EDUC x EXP -.001** -.002**  
 (.0003) (.0005)  
FEMALE -.084** .129** -.011 
 (.009) (.017) (.01) 
BLACK -.091** -.170** -.030** 
 (.011) (.026) (.013) 
OTH MINORITY -.047** -.132** -.041* 
 (.021) (.038) (.022) 
ln (JOB GRO) -.093 .751*  
 (.182) (.413)  
ln (AVE EARN) .052 .246**  
 (.054) (.097)  
UNEMP .006* .001  
 (.003) (.006)  
UNION .089** .395**  
 (.04) (.145)  
ln (CPI) 1.32** -.336 .169** 
 (.119) (.22) (.062) 
ln (PLAND) .018** .006 -.007 
 (.007) (.014) (.006) 
METRO .186** .215** -.013 
 (.015) (.031) (.019) 
NEAST .054** .009 -.011 
 (.013) (.027) (.012) 
WEST .049** -.133** -.013 
 (.015) (.033) (.015) 
SOUTH .033** -.047 .037** 
 (.016) (.03) (.012) 
ln (CB) .006 -.121*  
 (.034) (.065)  
St  .267 .741*  
 (.216) (.406)  
tS 4.17** 3.57**  
 (.354) (.750)  
CHILD < 6   -.015 
   (.017) 
NUMBER   -.047** 
   (.003) 
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ln V(1-t)   -.022* 
   (.12) 
E[B > 0]   .651** 
   (.11) 
E[ln(W(1-t)]   .109** 
   (.047) 
Constant -7.20** -1.11 6.48** 
 (.42) (.89) (.34) 
N 27564 27564 27564 
R2 .21 .07b .04 
Log likelihood  -16724  
Bootstrap Standard errors in parentheses. 
*indicates significance at the .01 level.  **indicates significance at the .05 level. 
aDummy variable indicating that the firm is providing a health insurance benefit. 
bPseudo-R-square. 
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Table 5:  Simultaneous Estimation of the Compensation and Labor Supply Equations 
Variable ln W ln (B) ln (h) 
EXP .041** .237** .008** 
 (.004) (.025) (.002) 
EXP2 -.0005** -.002** -.0002** 
 (.0000) (.0003) (.00004) 
EDUC .192** 1.22** -.004 
 (.013) (.084) (.005) 
EDUC2 -.003** -.034**  
 (.0005) (.004)  
EDUC x EXP -.001** -.009**  
 (.0002) (.001)  
FEMALE -.084** .375**  
 (.008) (.053)  
BLACK -.091** -.477** -.055** 
 (.012) (.08) (.011) 
OTH MINORITY -.047** -.369** -.063** 
 (.019) (.129) (.017) 
ln (JOB GRO) -.076 3.82**  
 (.19) (1.24)  
ln (AVE EARN) .060 .882**  
 (.049) (.323)  
UNEMP .007** .047**  
 (.003) (.02)  
UNION .086 .790**  
 (.054) (.358)  
ln (CPI) 1.32** .954 -.077 
 (.107) (.705) (.07) 
ln (PLAND) .018** .062 -.013** 
 (.007) (.046) (.006) 
METRO .186** .958** -.012 
 (.014) (.096) (.014) 
NEAST .055** -.026 -.009 
 (.013) (.09) (.01) 
WEST .049** -.581** -.022 
 (.015) (.101) (.015) 
SOUTH .034** -.632** .050** 
 (.014) (.097) (.016) 
ln (CB) .005 -.348  
 (.033) (.214)  
St  .280 3.10
**  
 (.185) (1.25)  
tS 4.13** 12.75**  
 (.363) (2.42)  
CHILD < 6   -.033** 
   (.015) 
NUMBER   -.023** 
   (.004) 
ln (V(1-t))   -.117** 
   (.024) 
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E[(ln (B))]   .044** 
   (.012) 
E[ln(W(1-t))]   .159** 
   (.053) 
Constant -7.21** -13.7**  
 (.42) (2.80)  
N 27564 27564 27564 
R2 .21 .08 .09 
Bootstrap Standard errors in parentheses. 
*indicates significance at the .01 level.  **indicates significance at the .05 level. 
 
Correlation Matrix of Residuals 
 ln(W) ln(B) ln(h) 
ln(W) 1.0 
ln(B) 0.34 1.0 
ln(h) 0.07 0.32 1.0  
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Endnotes 
 
1 Factual data based on Lettau and Buchmueller (1999), Sheu (2001), and the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce (1996). 
 
2 A similar argument is that prior studies have used firm expenditures on health insurance 
as a measure of firm cost.  As Cutler and Madrian point out, expenditures are a product of 
exogenous costs and endogenous benefit levels, and so their inclusion as a regressor 
would lead to bias in the estimated hours response to rising insurance costs.    
 
3 While their sample is not restricted to full-time workers, the Cutler and Madrian sample 
generates sample means that are consistent with those reported for full-time workers.  
Average work hours in their sample is 43.5 per week.  Comparable statistics for full-time 
workers in that age group reported by Rones, Ilg and Gardner (1997) were 44.9 for males 
and 43.3 overall.  The proportion of their sample receiving employer-provided health 
insurance was 84%, identical to the proportion of full-time workers receiving that benefit 
(Lattau and Buchmueller,1999). 
  
4 The consumer price index hospital and related services over the same period implies a 
163% increase, even larger than the 124 % increase in the data used in this study.  For 
broader health insurance plans that cover physician services as well as hospitalization, the 
broader index for medical care services suggests a 128% increase over the time period.  
Finally, the broadest price index for medical care rose 124% over the period, the same as 
our cost data from the Health Insurance Association of America.  Copnsequently, it 
appears that our measure which allows cross-sectional variation in cost of providing 
health insurance also does a good job of tracking the time series variation in the cost of 
providing health insurance. 
   
5 The statistics reported in Table 1 are based on a sample of single workers in the Current 
Population Survey.  Concentration on single workers allows us to avoid confusion caused 
by the potential joint decision on acceptance of employer-provided health insurance in 
two-earner households.  Nevertheless, the time paths of health insurance coverage and 
average employer contributions are similar to those reported in Cutler and Madrian 
(1998) or Sheu (2001). 
 
6 Several studies have concluded that rising marginal tax rates in the post World War II 
period have had a large impact on the provision of benefits.  See Currie and Madrian 
(1999) for a review. 
 
7 Eventually, the hours supply schedule may bend backward in wages or benefits, but it 
would never pay for the firm to raise compensation to that level. 
 
8 Montgomery and Shaw (1997) use such an efficiency wage formulation to derive firm 
tradeoffs between wages and pensions. 
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9 Some have argued that the difference in firm provision of benefits between full- and 
part-time workers is due to fixed costs of providing benefits.  While this may explain part 
of the difference, Lettau and Buchmueller (1999) report large differences between full- 
and part-time workers in firm provision of many types of benefits, even when there are 
no apparent fixed costs to benefit provision.  The strategic use of benefits to create 
convex compensation packages is a likely explanation. 
 
10 Currie and Madrian report that most empirical studies have failed to find an inverse 
empirical relationship between wages and health insurance benefits, presumably because 
of the difficulty of controlling fully for differences in worker ability.  As equations (4-5) 
suggest,  unobserved factors that shift f' upward would tend to raise both wages and 
benefits. Researchers have been able to find inverse relationships between wages and 
other benefits, however.  For examples, Montgomery and Shaw (1997) find an inverse 
relationship between pensions and wages and Gruber (1994) finds an inverse relationship 
between maternity benefits and wages. 
 
11  Extending health insurance benefits to part-time workers would shift the budget 
constraint upward between 0 and H* hours worked.  The wage would fall via the 
reservation utility condition.  Consequently, there would be both income and substitution 
effects toward leisure for part-time workers.   
 
12 Lettau and Buchmueller (1999) estimated that health insurance benefits averaged 
$3,078 per full-time worker. 
 
13Cutler and Madrian (1998) and Sheu (2001) concentrate on males on the presumption 
that men are less likely than women to have to coordinate benefits decisions.  However, it 
is not clear why this presumption would be accurate.  In theory, the choice of which 
compensation package to accept would be jointly determined between married couples, 
so the bias would exist for both married males and married females.  The rising 
popularity of cafeteria plans makes it even easier for married partners to tailor their 
individual compensation mix to meet joint objectives. 
 
14 The selection problem is not likely to be serious, as 94 percent of singles in this age 
range held a job in the previous year. 
 
15 The measure of education is an index indicating education level rather than years of 
education completed.  The average of 8.3 corresponds to between 13 and 14 years of 
completed schooling. 
16 For column 2, the marginal effects of variables are computed by )βf(
x
)F( •=∂
•∂ where 
)f(•  is the cumulative distribution function and )f(•  is the density function evaluated at 
sample means. 
 
17 Currie and Madrian (1999) found that most studies fail to find that wages and health 
insurance benefits are inversely related as one would expect from the theory of 
compensating differentials.  The common explanation that unobserved ability raises both 
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wages and benefits is consistent with our finding that the errors in the wage and benefits 
equations are positively correlated. 
